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COMMENT
Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amendment
I.

INTRODUCTION

Presently, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have stat-

utes that require the disclosure of some party's identity (for example,
an author or a sponsor) on political literature pertaining to elections.
The most common explanations given for these statutes are that they
deter fraud and libel in the election arena and that they provide valuable information to the voters. Because these statutes regulate core
political speech, however, they necessarily implicate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.' Although campaign disclosure laws have been both struck down and sustained by state courts
reviewing appealed convictions, the decisions have been disappointingly brief given the magnitude of the
interests involved. The federal
2
court case law has also been sparse.
In the two most recent decisions, the supreme courts of North Carolina and Ohio upheld their respective disclosure statutes.' The United
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the 1993 Ohio deci1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech...."); see Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966): Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of [the] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.
This of course includes discussion of candidates, structures, and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to
political processes.
2. Specifically: one court of appeals decision invalidating an earlier version of the
Oklahoma disclosure statute, one court of appeals decision reversing a conviction under the
predecessor to the current federal provision (on non-constitutional grounds), and one district
court decision sustaining the same. See Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987) (striking
Law of May 4, 1974, 1974 OKLA. SESS. LAws ch. 154, § 11 (amended 1976, 1983, 1984, 1986,
1988, 1991)); United States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974) (reversing conviction under Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 724, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 612, amended by Act of August 25,
1950, ch. 784, § 2, 64 Stat. 475, amended by Act of August 12, 1970, § 6j)(7), 84 Stat. 777 (repealed 1976)); United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961) (sustaining the same).
There are no rulings on the constitutionality of the current federal provision, 2 U.S.C. § 441d
(1988). See Note, Mitchell L. Gaynor, CurbingInjurious PAC Support Through 2 U.S.C. § 441d,
35 HAsTINGs L.J. 869, 879-88 (1984) (arguing that § 441d is constitutional). See infra text accompanying notes 26-32 for a comparison of the old and new federal provisions.
3. State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993) (sustaining N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-274 (1994)); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993) (sustaining
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1992)), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 93-986),
motion to dismiss denied, 114 S. Ct. 2670 (1994).
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sion and will hear arguments in October 1994. This article discusses
the background for the analysis of disclosure statutes, including the
statutes and state court holdings as well as the Supreme Court precedent, paying particular attention to both the Ohio statute and the
North Carolina provision. The two are sufficiently different such that
a ruling sustaining the Ohio statute will not dispose of every issue
raised by the North Carolina statute.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Survey of Disclosure Statutes

For the purposes of this article, a "disclosure statute" is any statute
requiring identification of party affiliation on political writing relating
to elections.4 At present, two states (California and Nebraska) have
no such statute. TWo other states have disclosure statutes which have
been held unconstitutional in their present form. Specifically, the Illinois disclosure statute was held unconstitutional by its supreme court
in 1987,1 and the Massachusetts statute was invalidated by its highest
court in 1975.6 In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
has held unconstitutional an earlier version of Oklahoma's disclosure
statute, which differed from the present Oklahoma provision only in
the inclusion of one sentence immaterial to the finding of unconstitutionality.7 Currently, forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
have some sort of disclosure provision applicable to campaign literature.8 In addition, the United States Code contains a campaign disclo4. This includes newspaper editorials endorsing a ballot measure, political advertising
("Vote for Joe"), political pamphlets criticizing the record of an incumbent, and so forth. I refer
to these statutes as "disclosure statutes," and to the writing regulated as "campaign literature."
Some of the statutes, however, explicitly regulate more than just literature pertaining to campaigns. See, eg., Aix. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (Michie 1993) (requiring disclosure on "matter of a
political nature"). See infra text accompanying notes 11-17.
5. People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (IlL. 1987) (striking down statute currently at ILLANN. STAT. ch. 10, para. 5/29-14 (Smith-Hurd 1994)); see also Thomas E. Leggins, Invalidationof
Illinois' Anonymous PoliticalLiterature Statute - The Unprotected Interest in an Informed Electorate - People v. White, 116 Ill. 2d 171, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (1987), 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677 (1988).
6. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975) (invalidating MAss. GEN.
LAws. ANN. ch. 56, § 41 (West 1992)).
7. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987) (invalidating Law of May 4, 1974, 1974
Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 154, § 11 (amended 1976, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1991)).
8. ALA. CODE § 17-22A-13 (1993); ALAsKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (1993); ARiz. REv. STAT.

ANN. § 16-912 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-108
(1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-333w (1993); DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8021 (1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1420 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-143, -1437 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2415 (1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 11-215 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, para. 529-14 (Smith-Hurd
1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-1-3 (Bums 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.14 (West 1992); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 25-2407 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.190 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463 (West 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1014 (West 1993);

MD. CODE ANN., ELEc § 26-17 (1993); MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 56, § 41 (West 1992); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.247 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.04 (West 1994); MiSS. CODE
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sure provision.9 Finally, of course, municipalities may pass disclosure
ordinances. 10
One way to categorize disclosure statutes is according to the writing
they regulate. Nearly one fourth require disclosure on essentially any
writing related to elections." Perhaps the three most remarkable statutes, at least as to the breadth of the writing to which they apply, are
those of Arkansas, Florida, and South Carolina. Arkansas requires
disclosure on all matters "of a political nature."' 2 Florida has passed
two statutes, one requiring disclosure of the sponsor on all political

ANN. § 23-15-899 (1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.031 (Vernon 1993); MONT.CODE ANN. § 13-35225 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:14 (1992); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 19:34-38.1 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-16, -17 (Michie 1993); N.Y.
EI c. LAW § 14-106 (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(7) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 16.1-10-04.1 (1993); Omno REV. CODE ANN.§ 3599.09 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1840 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.522 (1993); 25 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3258
(1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-23-2 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1354 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-25.4.1 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-120 (1993); TEX. ELEc.
CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 20-14-24 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 2022 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1014 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.510
(West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.30 (West 1993); Wyo. STAT.
§ 22-25-110 (1992).
9. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1988) provides:
Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, or solicits any
contribution through any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising
facility, direct mailing, or any other type of general public political advertising, such communication ... if not authorized by the candidate, an authorized political committee of the
candidate, or its agents, shall clearly state the name of the person who paid for the communication and state that the communication is not authorized by any candidate or candidate's
committee.
10. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (striking Los Angeles ordinance); Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408 (La. 1968) (striking Bogalusa ordinance).
11. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8021 (1993) ("all campaign literature or advertising"); MD.CODE ANN., EL~c. § 26-17 (1993) ("each item of campaign material"); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 664:14 (1992) ("all political advertising"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-16 (Michie
1993) ("any campaign advertising or communication"); S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-25.4.1
(1993) ("printed campaign literature")' WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.510 (West 1994) ("all
written political advertising, whether relating to candidates or ballot propositions"); W. VA.
CODE § 3-8-12 (1994) ("any... letter, circular, placard, or other publication tending to influence
voting at any election"); Wyo. STAT. § 22-25-110 (1992) ("campaign literature or campaign advertising in any communication medium"). See also State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262
N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978) (striking the predecessor to the current North Dakota statute, which
had applied to "every political advertisement").
12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (Michie 1993) provides:
Unless the statement, communication, advertisement, circular, pamphlet, form letter, mimeographed, printed, duplicated, or other similar matter plainly bears the name or names and
post office addresses of the individuals, firms, committees, or other group or groups sponsoring and bearing the cost, no statement, communication, or advertisement of a political
nature may be published in a newspaper or other periodical within the state of Arkansas,
and no circular, pamphlet, letter, form letter, statement, advertisement, or other similar
matter of a political nature, may be printed or distributed in this state.
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advertisements and campaign literature' 3 and the other requiring
identification on any advertisement "intended to influence public policy or the vote of a public official.' 1 4 South Carolina requires disclosure on communications supporting or opposing public officials (not
just candidates). 5 Rather than regulating political writing in general,
a substantial number of states specify that disclosure is required on
materials relating or referring to candidates, election issues, proposed
constitutional amendments, or the like. New Jersey, for example, requires disclosure on printed matter "having reference to any election
or to any candidate or to the adoption or rejection of any public question at any general, primary for the general, or special election."' 6
Despite the variations, most statutes also include a "catch-al"7 phrase
so that all materials relating to elections require disclosure.'

Three current statutes (and one repealed statute) explicitly require
disclosure on critical political speech. The Louisiana Supreme Court
struck down the predecessor to the current Louisiana statute, which
had banned anonymous materials making "scurrilous, false, or irresponsible adverse comment about a candidate."'" North Carolina currently requires disclosure only on derogatory comments about
candidates.' 9 In fact, North Carolina is the only state which requires
disclosure only on derogatory political writings. Rhode Island and
Texas, by way of contrast, each require disclosure on critical writing
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106-143 (West 1993) ("Any political advertisement and any campaign literature . . . shall . . . identify the persons or organizations sponsoring the
advertisement.").
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106-1437 (West 1993) ("Any advertisement, other than a political
advertisement, on billboards, bumper stickers, radio, or television, or in a newspaper, a magazine, or a periodical, intended to influence public policy or the vote of a public official, shall
clearly designate the sponsor of such advertisement.").
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1354 (Law. Co-op. 1991) ("A person who makes an independent expenditure in the distribution ... of a communication to voters supporting or opposing a
public official, a candidate, or a ballot measure must place his name and address on the printed
matter.").
16. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-38.1 (West 1994). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-108 (1993)
(relating to any candidate or issue); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1420 (1993) ("with reference to or
intended for the support of" a candidate, initiative, or referendum); MICH. Comp.LAWS ANN.
§ 169.247 (West 1993) ("having reference to an election, a candidate, or ballot question"); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-899 (1991) ("having reference to any election, or to any candidate").
17. See, e.g., Oi-o REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1992) (requiring disclosure on
any "publication which is designed to promote the nomination or defeat of a candidate ... [or
issue] . . .or to influence the voters ....")(emphasis added).
18. See State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989) (striking Act of August 5, 1976, 1976 La.
Acts No. 697 § 1463 (as amended 1977) (amended 1988, 1991, 1993).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(7) (1994) provides:
It shall be unlawful... [flor any person to publish in a newspaper or pamphlet or otherwise,
any charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated to affect the candidate's chances of
nomination or election, unless such publication be signed by the party giving publicity to
and being responsible for such charge.
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and then include a catch-all which sweeps in favorable writings to effectively neutralize the statute.2 °
Another way to categorize disclosure statutes is according to the
disclosure required. They are primarily divided into statutes which
require disclosure of the payor or sponsor,2 1disclosure of some party
"responsible, 22 and disclosure of the author.23 There are, however,
deviations from this schema. Some states, for instance, require disclosure of more than one party.24 A few states require disclosure of the
person "distributing or publishing" the writing. 2 The only safe generalization to be made is that the majority of states require disclosure of
the party financing the writing, and very few require disclosure of the
author.

A third way of categorizing disclosure statutes is according to
whether they link disclosure to the writing or distribution of campaign
literature, or to the accompanying expenditure of funds. Some statutes are cast to read "whoever publishes campaign literature must disclose .... 26 Others follow a different model: "whoever makes an

expenditure for the purpose of financing campaign literature must dis20. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-23-2 (1993) ("a circular, flier, or poster designed or tending to
injure or defeat any candidate for nomination or election to any public office, by criticizing the
candidate's personal character or political action, or designed to aid [or] injure any question")
(emphasis added); TEx. ELEc. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 1994) ("to injure a candidate or
influence the result of an election") (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (1993); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-912 (1993);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103 (Michie 1993); DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8021 (1993); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1420 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-143, 106-1437 (West 1993); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 11-215 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-1-13 (Bums 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.190
(Michie /Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.247 (West 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 130.031 (Vernon 1993); MONT.CODE ANN. § 13-35-225 (1993); NEV.REV. STAT. § 294A.320
(1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-16 (Michie 1993); N.D. CErr. CODE § 16.1-10-04.1 (1993);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1840 (West 1994); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. AtNNq. § 3258 (1992); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 8-13-1354 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-120 (1993); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 20-14-24 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.510 (West 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 22-25110 (1992).
22. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-22A-13 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2407 (1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1014 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., ErEc. § 26-17 (1993); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 41 (West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:14 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163-274(7) (1994); Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 260.522 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-1014 (Michie 1993).
23. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-899 (1991); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 17-23-2 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2022 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12
(1994).
24. See, e.g., S.D. CODFMED LAWS ANN. § 12-25-4.1 (1993) (requiring disclosure by financial
sponsor and person authorizing).
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-415 (1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.14 (West 1992).
26. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-415 (1993), which provides:

No person shall distribute, circulate, disseminate, or publish or cause to be distributed, circulated, disseminated, or published any literature in connection with any political campaign
for any public office or question unless such literature shall bear the name and address of
the person or organization distributing, circulating, disseminating, publishing, or causing to
be distributed, circulated, disseminated, or published.
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27 There may be a trend towards rewriting disclosure stat-

utes to link them more explicitly with expenditures. The original
Tennessee provision, for example, provided that all circulars referring
to candidates had to be signed by the writer.28 The new statute requires disclosure when an expenditure is made to finance a communication advocating the election or defeat of a candidate or measure. 29
Precisely the same revision was made to the federal provision.3' A
considerable number of statutes do not fall into either category, 31 and
several statutes triggered by writing or publication require disclosure
of the payor.3 2

Finally, one could categorize disclosure statutes according to the
placement of criminal liability. By and large the person whose name
must appear is also the person liable.3 3 A considerable number of
states, however, hold another party liable - most often the party
publishing or distributing -

if the payor's name is undisclosed.' 4 One

See also ALA. CODE § 17-22A-13 (1993); ALAsKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-103 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-108 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-1-3
(Bums 1993); IowA CODE ANN. § 56.14 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.04 (West 1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.031 (Vernon 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:34-38.1 (West 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-16 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 163.274(7) (1994); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1840 (West 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 260.522 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-23-2 (1993); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2022 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (1994).
27. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-225 (1993), providing that:
Whenever a person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications
advocating the success or defeat of a candidate, political party, or ballot issue through any
broadcasting station, newspaper... handbill ... or other form of general political advertising, the communication must clearly and conspicuously state the name and address of the
person.
See also Agiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-912 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-333w (1993); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1014 (West 1993); N.Y. Et.Ec. LAW § 14-106 (McKinney 1994); 25 PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3258 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-19-120 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 2-19-120 (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-14-24 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.30 (West
1993).
28. Act of April 20, 1972, 1972 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 740, § 1920 (amended 1987, 1989, 1990,
1991,1992).
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-120 (1993).
30. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1988) with Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 724,
amended by Act of August 25, 1950, ch. 784, § 2, 64 Stat. 475, amended by Act of August 12,
1970, § 6(j)(7), 84 Stat. 777 (repealed 1976).
31. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 8021 (1993) ("all campaign literature . . . shall
display ... ").
32. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.031 (Vernon 1993) ("Any person publishing, circulating,
or distributing any printed matter relative to any candidate for public office or any ballot measure shall on the face of the printed matter identify ... the person who paid for the printed
matter ... ").
33. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-415 (1993) ("No person shall ... distribute ... unless
).
such literature shall bear the name ... of the person distributing ....
34. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 130.031 (Vernon 1993) ("Any person publishing, circulating,
or distributing ...shall ... identify.. . the person who paid .... ").

150 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:144
state expands liability to essentially anyone involved.3 5 Usually the
infraction is a misdemeanor. 36 At least one state, however, has bifurcated the penalty; in New Mexico, it is a felony to publish or print
campaign material without the sponsor's name but only a misdemeanor to circulate or distribute the same. 7
B.

Ohio

The Ohio disclosure statute provides that:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written,
printed, posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is
designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of any issue, or to influence
the voters in any election, or make an expenditure for the purpose of
financing political communications through newspapers, magazines,
outdoor advertising facilities, direct mailings, or other similar types of
general public political advertising, or through flyers, handbills, or
other nonperiodical printed matter, unless there appears on such form
of publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement the name and residence or business address of the chairman,
treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the
38 same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.
This statute applies to a broad range of political writings (ultimately
any general publication designed to influence the voters); it requires
the signature of the person who makes or is responsible for the publication; and criminal liability attaches to both the author and the distributors. The only published decision construing the Ohio statute is
McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission.39 In spring 1988, Margaret
McIntyre produced unsigned flyers opposing a school levy on an upcoming ballot and handed them to persons attending two meetings
about the levy. 4° Her son and his girlfriend deposited some of the
flyers on the windshields of automobiles parked outside one meeting.4 The Ohio Elections Commission determined that McIntyre had
violated the Ohio disclosure statute, and the Ohio Supreme Court af35. MnNm. STAT. ANN. § 211B.04 (West 1994) ("A person who participates in the preparation or dissemination .... ").

36. See, e.g., MicH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 169.247 (West 1993) (subjecting offender to fine of
as much as $1000, imprisonment for as many as 90 days, or both).
37. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-16 (Michie 1993).
38. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1992).
39. 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 93-986), motion to dismiss denied, 114 S. Ct. 2670 (1994); see also State v. Babst, 135 N.E. 525 (Ohio 1922) (affirming
the predecessor to the current statute on the grounds that it was "regulatory" in nature); McIntyre, 618 N.E. 2d at 153 (noting that Babst may be dated).
40. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 152.
41. Brief of Petitioner at 4-5, McIntyre (No. 93-986).
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firmed its decision, rejecting her argument that the statute violated the
First Amendment.4 2 The Ohio Supreme Court listed the purposes of
this statute as (1) identification of those who distribute false statements; 43 (2) identification of persons responsible for libel, false advertising, and fraud;"4 and (3) the providing of information to voters so
they may better evaluate messages they receive. 41 This case is presently before the United States Supreme Court. 46
C. North Carolina
The North Carolina disclosure statute provides that:
Any person who shall, in connection with any primary or election in
this State, do any of the following acts and things declared in this section to be unlawful, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. It shall be unlawful: ... (7) For any person to publish in a newspaper or pamphlet

or otherwise, any charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated to
affect the candidate's chances of nomination or election, unless such
publication be signed by the party giving publicity to and being responsible for such charge.47
This statute differs from the Ohio statute in that it does not apply
across the board to political writings. Instead it applies only to.derogatory charges about candidates, and it does not contain a catch-all
provision. 48
State v. Petersilie4 9 is the only published North Carolina decision
construing this statute. In winter 1989, Frank Petersilie, a defeated
candidate for the town council of Boone, distributed anonymous mailings about two candidates in the run-off election.5" One mailing was a
letter his mother had received, accompanied by a Washington Post article written by the wife of one candidate. The candidate's wife ex42. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 156.
43. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 154.
44. Id. at 156.
45. Id. at 155-56. In its brief before the Supreme Court, the Ohio Elections Commission
characterized the state's interests as (1) the deterrence of fraud, false advertising, and libel; and
(2) the providing of pertinent information to voters. Brief of Respondent at 3, McIntyre (No. 93986).
46. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted, 114 S.

Ct. 1047 (No. 93-986), motion to dismiss denied, 114 S. Ct. 2670 (1994).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (1994).
48. The second half of the clause ("or calculated to affect the candidate's chances of nomination or election") could be construed as a catch-all provision to embrace "praise" about candidates, but the North Carolina Supreme Court did not so construe it. Nor did it hold that "affect"

means only "decrease." Indeed, the court did not address the statute's limitation to "derogatory" charges. The court's tone in describing the purpose of the statute, however, suggests that

"affect" means only "decrease." See State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 182-83, 432 S.E.2d 832,

839, 840, 843 (1993). See infra text accompanying notes 54-56.
49. 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993).

50. Id. at 172, S.E.2d at 834.

152 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:144
pressed displeasure with the religiousness of the people in Boone,
concern about the presence of religious items in government offices,
and concern about a potentially unconstitutional mixing of church and
state.5 1 The candidate was Jewish, and the media suggested that
Petersilie's mailings were deliberately anti-Semitic in order to manipulate the voters.5 2 The other mailing was a flyer advertising the two
5' 3
candidates on the strength of their being "pro-liquor candidates.
After the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation identified
Petersilie by comparing the handwriting on his notice of candidacy
with handwriting on the mailings, he was convicted of violating the
North Carolina disclosure statute. The North Carolina Supreme
Court identified its purpose as "prohibiting anonymous pejorative
campaign material,"' thereby both "protecting the integrity of the
'56
electoral process" 5 and "insuring as far as possible fair elections.
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, rejecting Petersilie's contention that the statute was overbroad. 7

III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Overbreadth

Analysis of disclosure statutes begins with Talley v. California,8 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance banning the distribution of anonymous handbills. Talley involved a section of the Municipal Code of Los Angeles which provided that "[n]o
person shall distribute any hand-bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof,
the name and address of ... [t]he person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same. ' 59 Talley had distributed handbills
urging a boycott of local merchants who carried the products of manufacturers suspected of racist hiring practices, and he argued on appeal
of his conviction that the ordinance violated his freedom of speech.6'
The Court first noted that a flat ban on the distribution of literature
would be unconstitutional. 6 ' Indeed, such a ban would not necessarily
be saved simply by virtue of having a legitimate purpose, such as the
51. Id. at 173-74, S.E.2d at 834-35.
52. Boone Landlord Faces Smear Charge in Town Council Election, UPI, Jan. 11, 1990,
availablein LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
53. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 174, 432 S.E.2d at 835.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 182, 432 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 187, 432 S.E.2d at 843.
Id. at 182, 432 S.E.2d at 840.
Id. at 191, 432 S.E.2d at 845.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 62 (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1937)).
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prevention of fraud, disorder, or littering.62 The First Amendment
compels the State to use a narrower remedy, for example, a statute
preventing littering itself.63 This said, the Court turned to the Los Angeles ordinance, which it construed as a flat ban on distribution, with
an exception for signed materials. Although the City of Los Angeles
argued that its ordinance provided a way to identify persons responsible for fraud, false advertising, and libel, the Court concluded that
"the ordinance is in no manner so limited."' Indeed, neither the statute nor its legislative history lent credence to the asserted purpose.65
Moreover, such an identification requirement would almost certainly
suppress the flow of information, 66 information that has historically
been of tremendous value. 67 The government may not compel identification when fear of reprisal might in this way deter discussion of
important public matters.68
Talley's importance lies in the strong words used by the Court to
describe anonymous political speech:
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have
played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted
groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able
to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at
all. The obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the
circulation of literature critical of the government. The old seditious
libel cases in England show the lengths to which government had to go
to find out who was responsible for books that were obnoxious to the
rulers. John Lilburne was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to
answer questions designed to get evidence to convict him or someone
else for the secret distribution of books in England. Two Puritan Ministers, John Penry and John Udal, were sentenced to death on charges
that they were responsible for writing, printing or publishing books.
Before the Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily could have
62. Id. at 63 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
63. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) ("If it is said that these means are less
efficient and convenient ... the answer is that considerations of this sort do not empower a
municipality to abridge freedom of speech and press.").
64. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
65. Id.

66. Id. ("There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.").
67. Id. ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.").
68. Id. at 65 ("[T]here are times and circumstances when States may not compel members
of groups engaged in dissemination of ideas to be publicly identified. The reason... [is] that
identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance." (citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958)).)
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brought down on them prosecutions by English-controlled courts.
Along about that time the Letters of Junius were written and the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were
published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity
69 has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.
The decision is also important for the precedent it sets with respect to
anonymity and overbreadth. Admittedly, the Talley Court declined to
pass on the validity of "an ordinance limited to prevent [fraud, false
advertising, or libel] or any other supposed evils." 7 An ordinance
narrowly designed to achieve these goals - prevention of fraud, false
advertising, and libel - might have been sustained. Equally, an ordinance narrowly tailored to achieve different goals might have been
sustained. But the Talley test is whether such a statute also sweeps in
highly protected speech, and in particular, anonymous political
speech.71
In its overbreadth analysis in McIntyre, the Ohio Supreme Court
found the purpose of the Ohio statute to be to identify persons responsible for false statements. 72 Because prosecutions for failure to
disclose necessarily begin with identification of the party in question,
the statute will achieve its goal and a good deal more. It identifies
parties responsible for all statements, including false statements,
either through compliance or through prosecution. More to the point,
however (and perhaps this is what the court meant to write), the statute may eliminate negligent false statements from the election arena
since deliberate false statements would be tantamount to libel. Specifically, it may prompt the writer to verify his information prior to publication. As a practical matter, he will only do so if the likelihood of
prosecution, stiffness of penalty, and accompanying embarrassment
outweigh the inconvenience of additional research.
Even though a disclosure statute may eliminate false statements, it
is overbroad insofar as it may also eliminate true statements as well.
Imagine, for example, a city employee who anonymously distributes
information given to him by informants claiming to have seen the in69. Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 64. Here the Court interchanged the state interest in identifying libelers and the
state interest in preventing libel.
71. The North Carolina and Ohio disclosure statutes completely invert the Talley test by
explicitly banning precisely this (and only this) highly protected anonymous political speech.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274 (1994); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Anderson 1992). In 1980,
the Court invalidated a similarly inverted scheme whereby commercial speech was afforded
more protection than noncommercial speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490
(1980). The City of San Diego had permitted on-site advertising on billboards, but not political
or social messages. Id. at 495-96.
72. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 154 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 1047 (No. 93-986), motion to dismiss denied, 114 S.Ct. 2670 (1994).
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cumbent mayoral candidate accept a bribe, and assume that he has no
reason to doubt the informants. On the one hand, the Ohio disclosure
statute might not prompt him to verify his information since a misdemeanor prosecution for failure to sign would ensue regardless of the
accuracy of the statement and since there are no civil repercussions
for such false statements.73 On the other hand, it might silence him if
significant extralegal repercussions would follow the exposure attendant to a misdemeanor conviction. Thus, a disclosure statute may silence someone whose informants were correct. The extent to which
false statements are particularly in need of attribution is unclear. In
any event, to the extent that the purpose of a disclosure statute is prevention of false statements, a narrower solution is available: a ban on
the false statements themselves, a "campaign falsity statute. 74
Nor is it clear that a surgically precise ban on false statements about
candidates would necessarily be constitutional. One constraint on
such a statute would stem from New York Times v. Sullivan,7 5 in which

the New York Times published a full page advertisement containing
what turned out to be false statements which could reasonably be
linked to an elected commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama.76
Rather than verifying the accuracy of the statements contained in the
advertisement, the Times relied on the reputations of the persons
listed as sponsors. The rule of Sullivan is that false statements of fact
about public figures are not actionable as libel unless made with actual
malice (actual knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard as to
their falsity). 77 The driving force of Sullivan is neither that false statements contribute to the debate about public officials,78 nor that false
statements are especially deserving of protection as opposed to, for
example, dissenting political writing. Rather, the specter of damages
might silence a person who is not willing to stake everything on the
accuracy of valuable truthful information that he wishes to impart.
73. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that false statements of fact
about public officials are not actionable libel unless made with actual malice).
74. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (1993) ("No person may knowingly sponsor

any political advertisement or news release that contains any assertion, representation, or statement of fact ... which the sponsor knows the be untrue, deceptive, or misleading .....
75. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
76. Id. at 256.

77. See also Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that a public figure cannot recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing that the publication con-

tains a false statement of fact made with actual malice); Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss, 472
U.S. 749 (1985) (holding that actual malice need not be shown if the issue is not a matter of
public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that a private individual

may recover damages for defamation with a showing of negligence).
78. But see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 ("[E]ven a false statement may be deemed to
make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.'" (citing JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 15 (1947)).
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The First Amendment places a high burden on the libel plaintiff so
that the speaker may feel relatively secure about contributing to the
public debate.79 Society's need for the debate to be "uninhibited, robust, and wide open" 80 outweighs the defamed public figure's need for
compensation. 8 ' So with respect to the first purpose articulated by the
Ohio Supreme Court, which is the identification of persons responsible for false statements, not only is there the narrower alternative of a
campaign falsity statute, but Sullivan also suggests that this sort of
statute might require an actual malice standard. 8
Another purpose allegedly served by the Ohio disclosure statute is
the identification and deterrence of persons responsible for fraud,
false advertising, and libel. Plainly, the Ohio statute will accomplish
both. For example, by prosecuting for the misdemeanor, the State
identifies the libeler for the private plaintiff. By thus making libel
suits easier, the State deters libel in the election arena. Such deterrence might serve some sort of societal interest in an election free of
libel. Deterrence might also benefit the individual candidate, as well
as, or better than, would simple facilitation of libel suits. 83 The Ohio
statute is considerably narrower than the Los Angeles ordinance in
Talley. But while a disclosure statute may silence libelers, it also silences those who have chosen the shield of anonymity to avoid harassment or embarrassment and whose purposes would be frustrated by
the exposure accompanying a misdemeanor conviction. The disclosure statute still falls squarely under the overbreadth rulings in Schnei79. Cf. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 6i2 (1954) (upholding statute which requires registration of paid lobbyists, because it provides members of Congress with valuable information). Although the Harriss Court sustained disclosure despite arguments about deterrence, the
holding pertains to the peculiarly narrow context of lobbyists influencing Congress, rather than
contributing to the public debate.
80. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
81. See Monitor v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 n.3 (1971):
The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast and the advantages
derived are so great that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals
must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public
benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character is so small
that such discussion must be privileged.
(quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908)).
82. See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1981) ("The chilling effect of... absolute

accountability for factual misstatements in the course of political debate is incompatible with the
atmosphere of free discussion contemplated by the First Amendment in the context of political
campaigns."); Petrask v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 926 F.2d 573,577 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding Ohio

campaign falsity statute with actual malice standard consistent with New York Times v. Sullivan).
83. Libel of a candidate may be a harm which money damages cannot adequately redress

since a libel suit will end well after the election and rebuttal may exacerbate the problem by
drawing attention to the original libel. See Jack Winsbro, Misrepresentationin PoliticalAdvertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions, 36 EMORY L.J. 853, 889-91 (1987).
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der and Talley.' It sweeps in highly protected speech, and the
narrower alternative of the criminal libel statute is available.85
One might argue in reply that the Sullivan burden on the libel plaintiff sufficiently protects the distributor of political literature and sufficiently ensures the debate that he does not need the additional
protection of a right to anonymity. In other words, while a disclosure
statute makes a libel suit "easier," the First Amendment still makes
the libel suit "difficult" by placing an actual malice standard on the
plaintiff. An additional right to anonymity will provide further protection to the libeler. Indeed, the Court has sustained forced disclosure of the sources of a newspaper story pursuant to a discovery order
in a civil defamation suit with roughly this reasoning.86 The knowledge that a discovery order will outweigh any right to anonymity will
deter those libelers unwilling to rely solely on the protection of the
actual malice burden. It will not necessarily, however, deter writers
who fear extrajudicial harassment, economic harassment, physical violence, or embarrassment' rather than a libel suit. This is because a
discovery order in a civil defamation suit very likely follows a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim; in other words, non-libelers are
not really threatened by such discovery orders. This result, deterrence
of libelers without affecting other writers, will not follow a flat disclosure statute. Rather, a flat disclosure requirement unquestionably ex84. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (banning distribution of anonymous handbills overbroad for alleged purpose of identifying persons responsible for fraud, false advertising,
and libel); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (banning leaftetting to prevent fraud, disorder,
or littering unconstitutional when those can be punished instead).
85. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 114 S. Ct. 2445,
2479 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted):
That some speech within a broad category causes harm, however, does not justify restricting
the whole category... If the government wants to avoid littering, it may ban littering, but it
may not ban lealetting... If the government wants to avoid fraudulent political fundraising, it may bar the fraud, but it may not in the process prohibit legitimate fundraising.
86. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169 (1979) ("[A]ccording an absolute privilege to the
editorial process of a media defendant in a libel case ... would substantially enhance the burden
of proving actual malice, contrary to the expectations of New York Times .... ") (emphasis
added). Several state courts have used similar reasoning to sustain disclosure statutes. See, e.g.,
Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976) ("While the right to publish anonymous
material may exist to some degree, it does not seem altogether naive to assume that a fundamental objective of the First Amendment was to obviate the necessity for anonymity."); see also
State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 737 (N.D. 1978) (Sand, J., concurring):
[B]ecause of the harsh [seditious] libel laws of England, a violation of which could subject the
offender to the death penalty or the loss of all property plus a long jail sentence, there was a
need for anonymity at the time the Colonies were formulating and struggling for their independence from England... [but] the inhabitants of the Colonies in the pre-Independence days [did
not] experience[ ] 'our' free open elections and for this reason I cannot agree that the First
Amendment was adopted and designed to assure or protect anonymity in the election process.
87. See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure on ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39-54 (1991) (providing examples of
violence, economic sanctions, and social sanctions).
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poses non-libelers, and its deterrent effect is certain. In short, while
the Sullivan burden might replace anonymity for those fearing civil
litigation on account of their speech, it cannot do so for those fearing
extrajudicial repercussions.
Indeed, it is precisely the risk of intimidation and extrajudicial
repercussions which necessitates a guarantee of anonymity, as the
Court recognized thirty years ago in a series of cases involving the
NAACP. In NAACP v. Alabama,88 the State of Alabama attempted
to oust the NAACP for failure to comply with a qualification statute
for corporations doing business in the state. As part of its civil ouster
suit, Alabama obtained a court order for the organization's membership list. 89 In Bates v. City of Little Rock,' the City of Little Rock
sought a list of contributors to the NAACP pursuant to a municipal
licensing scheme. 9 And in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative
Committee,92 the Committee sought the membership list of the Miami
branch of the NAACP in order to determine if certain suspected
Communists were members. 3 In all three cases, the NAACP argued
that disclosure would subject members to harassment and would deter
potential members from joining. Although the abridgment of protected freedoms was indirect - deterrence of the exercise of a constitutional right (association) on account of private action (harassment)
facilitated by unrelated state interests (for example, municipal licensing)94 - the Court found that the First Amendment precluded forced
disclosure. 95 And although these cases are grounded in the importance of political association and the obvious Southern hostility to the
NAACP, together they stand for the notion that the First Amendment
shields unpopular groups espousing unpopular ideas from harassment
both by hostile states and by private parties. 96 Herbert v. Lando97
88.
89.
90.
91.

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Id. at 451.
361 U.S. 516 (1960).
Id. at 517-18.

92. 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
93. Id. at 541.
94. In a more recent case, the Court relied on Bates to again confirm that the State cannot
require information from an organization and thereby indirectly infringe on First Amendment
associational freedoms, absent a connection between the information sought and the State's interest. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992) (finding it constitutional error to admit
stipulation of criminal defendant's membership in white supremacist gang).
95. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) ("Freedoms such as these
are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more
subtle governmental interference."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) ("In the
domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, the decisions of
this Court recognize that abridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably
follow from varied forms of governmental action.").
96. In contrast, many writers extolling "responsibility" dismiss First Amendment arguments
premised on private harassment. Some, for example, describe anonymity as "cowardly." See,
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may be distinguished from these cases in that the newspaper claimed
anonymity on98behalf of would-be libel defendants (in some sense,
"wrongdoers" ) who would, in any event, still receive the protection
of the Sullivan actual malice burden. By way of contrast, the NAACP
members were pursuing protected activities and would receive no additional protection from the repercussions of disclosure. Many anonymous pamphleteers could be similarly situated.
The first two interests served by the Ohio statute (identification of
persons making false statements, and identification of persons responsible for libel, false advertising, and fraud) are thus insufficient to sustain it. The statute deters anonymous political speech unrelated to
these stated interests, and it facilitates harassment of those speakers.
By and large, state court decisions since Talley have been in accord
with this assessment, striking disclosure statutes as overbroad.99 In
e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 40 A.2d 137, 139 (Penn. 1944) ("[The statute] is an attempt to
raise the ethical standards of political discussion, to promote fair play and fair competition in
politics, to banish cowards from the political arena, and to extirpate the dirty business of surreptitious character assassination."); see also Comment, Gutter Politics and the FirstAmendment, 6
VAL. U. L. REv. 185, 201 (1972) ("It is difficult to imagine why an individual would object to
putting his name on a legitimate piece of campaign literature."). Some extol the taking of responsibility. See, e.g., University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990) ("Not all academics
will hesitate to stand up and be counted when they evaluate their peers."). And some argue that
the First Amendment guarantee of "free speech" permits precisely this taking of responsibility.
See, e.g., Morefield v. Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1976) ("[I]t does not seem altogether
naive to assume that a fundamental objective of the First Amendment was to obviate the necessity for anonymity."). The argument for anonymity on the grounds of intimidation finds substantial support, however, in our adoption of the secret ballot. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.Ct.
1846, 1852-54 (1992). In reviewing adoption of polling booths to alleviate problems of voter
intimidation and election fraud, the Court stated, "The opportunities that the viva voce [showing
of hands] system gave for bribery and intimidationgradually led to its repeal." (emphasis added).
Id. at 1852. Related to the arguments from responsibility is the argument that disseminators of
the written word are not entitled by the First Amendment to more protection than is available to
speakers. See, e.g., Bogalusa v. May, 212 So.2d 408, 408 (La. 1968) (holding that constitutional
guarantees protecting written speech and the press do not include anonymity, but rather require
identification "just as one who would speak from a speaker's rostrum would identify himself").
Anonymity is, however, available to the speaker; for instance, the informant on a television news
program who is filmed in shadow or whose facial features are disguised by computer. See
Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813, 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (striking, for overbreadth, statute which prohibited the wearing of masks in public and noting that "under certain
circumstances, anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional rights").
97. 441 U.S. 153 (permitting forced disclosure pursuant to a discovery order in private libel
suit); see supra note 86.
98. Compare NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) ("[T]he immunity from state
scrutiny of membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its members is so related
to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate
freely with others in so doing as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
with Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 75-77 (1928) (upholding as applied to the Ku Klux Klan
a New York statute requiring disclosure of members of any unincorporated association demanding an oath as a condition of membership, and resting its decision on the nature of Klan activities, specifically, unlawful intimidation and violence).
99. Compare Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980) (striking California statute) and People v. Drake, 159 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Cal. App.
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Schuster v. Imperial County Municipal Court,' for example, the California Court of Appeal invalidated a disclosure statute because it embraced more speech than necessary to achieve the asserted goals of
assisting the voters to distinguish truth from falsity, facilitating redress
for libel, and discouraging campaign falsity. Specifically, noted the
court, "such state interests can be furthered through more narrowly
constructed statutes without the criminalization of anonymously uttering the truth.'' 11 Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a statute which applied "to all political advertisements, 'whether
on behalf of or in opposition to' candidates or measures, and ... to all

types of advertisements, whether true or false," was overbroad for any
interest in avoiding "political smears," "character assassinations," and
"baseless, anonymous slanders.., during the last few hours before an
election."' 2
Dep't. Super. Ct. 1979) (striking California statute) and People v. Bongiorni, 23 Cal. Rptr. 565
(Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1962) (striking California statute) and People v. White, 506 N.E. 2d
1284 (II1. 1987) (striking Illinois statute) and State v. Burgess, 543 So.2d 1332 (La. 1989) (striking
Louisiana statute) and State v. Fulton, 337 So.2d 866 (La. 1976) (striking Louisiana statute) and
People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (striking New York statute) and State
v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D. 1978) (striking North Dakota statute) with
State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982) (sustaining Tennessee statute) and Morefield v.
Moore, 540 S.W.2d 873 (Ky. 1976) (sustaining Kentucky statute). See also In re Opinion of the
Justices, 324 A.2d 211 (Del. 1974) (proposed statute requiring every newspaper editorial to be
signed by the writer would be unconstitutional under Talley); Opinion of the Justices, 306 A.2d
18 (Me. 1973) (proposed legislation making it a crime for a paper to publish an editorial without
the author's name would be unconstitutionally overbroad). But see State v. Petersiie, 334 N.C.
169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993) (sustaining North Carolina statute); McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1047 (No. 93-986), motion to
dismiss denied, 114 S. Ct. 2670 (1994) (sustaining Ohio statute).
100. 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
101. Id. at 452. See also People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (I11.1987) ("The State has an
interest in preventing the intentional deception of the voters, but that interest cannot be served
by a statute that sweeps too broadly, and in so doing stifles speech which has little or no tendency to misinform, let alone deceive."); People v. Drake, 159 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (Cal. App.
Dep't. Super. Ct. 1979) (finding that statute banning anonymous material regardless of the "innocence of the motive [and] the truth of the ... material" sweeps too broadly for an interest in
an "undeceived" electorate); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (statute
banning any anonymous handbills connected to any election overbroad for state interests in
deterring defamation and helping enforcement of contribution and expenditure provisions).
102. State v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 736 (N.D. 1978). Several disclosure statute decisions do not rest on First Amendment grounds. See, e.g., Canon v. Justice Court,
393 P.2d 428 (Cal. 1964) (striking a statute which prohibited writing or distributing circulars
without the name of a responsible voter as "unconstitutionally discriminatory"); State v. Barney,
448 P.2d 195 (Idaho 1968) (striking on due process grounds a statute which made it unlawful to
publish or distribute and to transport campaign literature of a candidate without the name of the
group responsible); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975) (striking a statute,
on equal protection grounds, which made it a crime to write or distribute any circular designed
to aid or defeat any candidate or any question submitted to the voters unless it contained the
name of a voter responsible); People v. Clampitt, 222 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. Ct. Spec. Sess. 1961)
(striking a statute which prohibited printing or reproducing in quantity any anonymous handbills
about candidates, because of the indefiniteness of the expression "in quantity"); State v. Babst,
135 N.E. 525 (Ohio 1922) (affirming a conviction on the grounds that the statute was neutral and
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Balancing

Perhaps the most troubling state court decision before McIntyre and
Petersilie,however, is a 1982 case from Tennessee sustaining a disclosure statute as perfectly tailored.103 The Tennessee disclosure law provided that "[a]ll written or printed ... statements with reference to
any ... candidate ...

shall be signed by the writer thereof."'1

This

statute, noted the Tennessee Supreme Court, enables voters to assess
the "bias, interest, and credibility of the person or organization disseminating information about political candidates." 0 5 (According to
the Ohio Supreme Court, the Ohio statute also serves this interest.)
The Tennessee court concluded that there was no more narrow way to
provide this information to the voter and, on the strength of this conclusion, affirmed the statute. While correct that the statute was not
overbroad," °6 the Tennessee court did not address whether a disclosure statute perfectly tailored to inform10the
electorate in this way can
7
be squared with the First Amendment.
In short, once overbreadth is put aside, what remains is a perfectly
tailored election law clearly abridging some rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment. Balancing must follow, 0 8 but balancing is inherently dangerous, particularly since explicit infringement of political
speech necessitates especially rigorous scrutiny. In Anderson v. Celebrezze,' ° the Court invalidated an Ohio statute which required independent candidates for President to adhere to an early filing
deadline. The Court held that the state's interest in voter education
was insufficient justification for the statute's burden on the associational rights of independent voters and candidates, seven months being clearly longer than necessary for voters to learn about a
candidate. 110 In so reasoning, the Anderson Court endorsed careful
regulatory). See generally John C. Williams, Annotation, Validity and Constructionof State Statute ProhibitingAnonymous PoliticalAdvertising, 4 A.L.R. 4th 741 (1981).
103. State v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306 (Tenn. 1982).
104. Id. at 306.

105. Id. at 307.
106. The statute is not overbroad because its purpose is to identify the source, on the basis of
which the voters may draw inferences about bias, interest, and credibility.
107. Other courts have struck down statutes despite perfect tailoring for information gathering. See, e.g., People v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, 1288 (Ill. 1987) (rejecting argument from "informed electorate"). This more basic question was not addressed by the North Carolina court,
which rested its decision purely on overbreadth. State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 179, 432 S.E.2d

832, 848 (1993) (Mitchell, J., dissenting) ("I have grave reservations as to whether, consistent
with the First Amendment, any public purpose can justify such a limitation on pure political

expression . . . ").
108. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) ("(A]s a practical matter, there must be
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order,

rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.").
109. 460 U.S. 780 (1982).
110. Id. at 795-97.
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and thorough balancing when an election statute treads on First
Amendment prerogatives."' At the same time, the Anderson Court
noted that "the State's important... interests [in regulation of elections] are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions [on the individual's right to vote and right to associate],"" 2 dicta which became the linchpin of the Ohio decision in McIntyre. Specifically, the Ohio Supreme Court found its disclosure law
to have no impact on the content of campaign literature," 3 and then
sustained it on the strength of Anderson, which it took to endorse
14 and on the strength of the
"lower" scrutiny in such a situation,
15
education.
voter
in
state's interest
Disclosure statutes do, however, affect the content of campaign
literature, and lower scrutiny is not appropriate simply on account of
the state's having articulated an election interest.1 6 Rather, the added
strength of the state's interest increases the chances the statute will
survive strict scrutiny. While on its face a disclosure law simply requires the inclusion of objective data on written campaign literature,
111. The Court stated:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It
must then identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it must also consider the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.... The
results of this evaluation will not be automatic ...there is 'no substitute for the hard judgments that must be made.'
Id. at 789 (citations omitted) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
112. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. The Court stated further, "We have upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process." Id. at 788, n. 9.
113. McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 618 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ohio 1993), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 1047 (No. 93-986), motion to dismiss denied, 114 S.Ct. 2670 (1994) ("The minor requirement ... that those persons producing campaign literature identify themselves ... neither impacts the content of their message nor significantly burdens their ability to have it
disseminated."). In a similar vein, several state courts have taken pains to construe disclosure
statutes as neither prohibitions of anonymous political speech nor regulation of political speech,
but instead as disclosure requirements. The malum prohibitum, these courts write, is anonymity.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dennis, 404 A.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1944) ("[T]he essence of the crime
is anonymity... [A]nonymity is the core of the offense, and it is committed whether the content
is true or false."); Commonwealth v. Acquavia, 145 A.2d 407, 410 (Pa. 1944) ("It is the anonymity of the publication which is forbidden and which is the essence of the offense.").
114. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 155 (" '[T]o subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny
and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest ...
would tie the hands of States seeking to ensure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.' ") (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1992)).
115. McIntyre, 618 N.E.2d at 156.
116. In other situations, the Court has lowered its scrutiny on account of a state interest
related to elections. See e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1965) (striking state statute which
made it a crime for a newspaper editor to publish an editorial on election day urging people to
vote in a particular way); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (1992) (applying strict scrutiny to
statute prohibiting election day solicitation of voters within 100 feet of polls).
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the NAACP cases teach us that unconstitutional abridgment of rights
may be worked by privately imposed harassment following disclosure
mandated by the government.117 The mechanics of the disclosure statutes are the same. By virtue of a campaign disclosure law, writers of
political literature disclose their names to the public, thereby facilitating extrajudicial harassment and reprisal, which might in turn discourage others from writing. 118 This leads to an abridgment of speech.
Because reprisal (and thus deterrence) is necessarily wedded to the
content of the speech, an entire body of political speech, speech critical of the government, of those in power, and of the status quo, is lost
(for example, speech which is nonconforming, sometimes reactionary,
sometimes revolutionary; speech which is unpopular and crucial
to our 11process
of government). This speech is anonymous for a
9
reason.

The historical record testifies to the distinct content and role of
anonymous political writing. The political arena of early modern Britain and colonial (and early Republic) America was clogged with anonymous and pseudonymous political writings. 120 One contemporary
writer commented, anonymously, that "[the] requirement that authors
fix their names to their publications... would put an end to many
a
worthwhile contributions which could only be made anonymously.'' 2
In America, "between 1789 and 1809... six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty senators, and thirty-four congressmen ?ublished
political writings either unsigned or under pen names."' 2 At the
117. See supra text accompanying notes 88-98.
118. Arguably, the guarantee of anonymity encourages candor to the benefit of the electoral
process. See People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("Anonymity has
been, historically, the medium of dissidents, shielding them from the retaliatory power of the
established and, whether their fears of reprisal were justified or not, encouragingthem to express
unpopular views. Anonymous writings have an honored place in our political heritage.") (emphasis added).
119. Disclosure statutes are necessarily content-based. The disclosure requirement is trig-

gered by the particular content of the expression; specifically, political speech about candidates
or issues. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (compelling

newspaper to print a reply "exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper"). Moreover, the statutes dictate the content of the compelled speech. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the
Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1987) ("Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make
necessarily alters the content of the speech.").

120. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 n.3 (1960) (mentioning Thomas Paine);
155 (1985) (discussing Junius letter in

LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS

London Evening Post); Note, ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1085 (1961)
(discussing Daniel Defoe, Jonathan Swift, and Samuel Johnson, among others).
121. LEVY, supra note 120, at 107 (citing "Tory Author"). See generally id. at 89-118 (discussing Daniel Defoe's anonymous publication of A Vindication of the Press, the pro-restraint
response by "A Young Gentleman of the Temple," and the moderate position of "Tory
Author").
122. Note, supra note 120, at 1085 (citing 4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF MARSHALL 313-19

(1919)). See e.g., LEVY, supra note 120, at 62 (letters of Cato); id. at 160 (Judge William Smith's
criticism of special verdicts in libel trials); Note, supranote 120, at 1085 (listing THE FEDERALIST
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same time, the British and American governments tried to suppress
this speech; for example, Star Chamber's licensing laws of 1590 limited the number of printers and required that every book be licensed
before sale.123 Both governments prosecuted for seditious libel 124 and
used other tactics to harass their critics."2 Nor were violence and harassment inflicted only by government; the record also contains exampies of privately imposed violence for unpopular views. 126 And
despite arguments to the contrary, 27 both physical violence and informal economic sanctions clearly continue in modem times. 28 The
need for anonymity thus persists to this day.'29 Campaign disclosure
laws, then, are not even-handed; they result in the complete loss of a
valuable and unique subset of political speech.
PAPERS; the Letters of Pacificus by Alexander Hamilton, which defended Washington's proclamation of neutrality; Madison's response in the Letters of Helvius; and Chief Justice Marshall's
anonymous defense of Supreme Court decisions).
123. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 65 ("The ... press licensing law ... was due in part to the
knowledge that exposure of the names of printers, writers, and distributors would lessen the
circulation of literature critical of the government."). See also ZECHARLA CHAFEE, JR., THE
BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 192-206 (1956).

124. See e.g., Talley, 362 U.S. at 65 (harassment of John Lilburne for sending "factious and
scandalous" books from Holland to Scotland); CHAFEE, supra note 123, at 192-97 (trial of John
Udall in 1590 for authoring slanderous libel against the Queen); LEVY,supranote 120, at 145-47
(Wilkes trial in Britain), 124-33 (Zenger trial in America). See generally LEVY, supra note 120,
at 3-16; William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression,
84 COLuM. L. REv.91 (1984). The North Carolina statute skates dangerously close to the functional equivalent of a seditious libel statute. See infra text accompanying notes 138-140.
125. See LEVY, supra note 120, at 64 (New York legislature asks governor to offer reward for
discovery of author of seditious letter); id. at 48-50 (harassment of Andrew Bradford for aspersive anonymous pamphlet he printed); id. at 72-73 (jailing of leader of Regulators on suspicion of
authoring article which attacked the North Carolina assembly); see also Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-49 (1936) (containing historical review of press restraint in England
including a tax imposed in 1712 to suppress criticism).
126. See, e.g., LEvy, supra note 120, at 85 (publisher of loyalist paper had his windows
smashed and received threats of further violence during Revolution), 175 (publisher of loyalist
tract hauled out of bed by vigilantes and forced both to burn his manuscript and to destroy the
plates).
127. See, eg., People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("Fear of reprisals are [sic] largely illusory now.").
128. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 87, at 39 n.108 (beating of farm worker circulating petition
at union rally), 42 (in the 1950s, "public registration as a member of the Communist Party was
economic suicide").
129. See Brief of Petitioner at 13-14, McIntyre (No. 93-986) (State Department official
George Kennan publishes article on foreign policy under pseudonym "X"). The Court has recognized the harassment of persons with unpopular political beliefs in the context of modern
elections. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (upholding the reporting and disclosure
requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act but conceding that the First Amendment
exempts minor parties who show "a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a
party's contributors' names [would] subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals"); Brown v.
Socialist Workers '74 Campaign, 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (granting the Socialist Party an exemption to
the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law on the strength of a Buckley showing). See also
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Hall-lyner Election Campaign Comm'n, 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982)
(exempting the Communist party from disclosure requirement).
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On the other side of the equation is the electoral process, specifically the state's interest in "election integrity." "Election integrity"
means, at the least, the absence of corruption and the prevention of
physical intimidation and harassment of voters. These interests will,
in some situations, outweigh 'a First Amendment prerogative. 13° But
campaign disclosure laws do not further this sort of election integrity. 3 1 Rather, it is alleged that they ensure a "rational" vote and a
"more informed" vote as opposed to a vote reflecting misinformation
or appeals to prejudice.
This is not to say that disclosure statutes actually further a rational
or more informed vote. Nor is it to say that these interests are as
compelling as prevention of physical intimidation and harassment.
Certainly, simply labelling them "election integrity" is no answer. Insofar as disclosure laws deter criticism and smear campaigns, 132 they
will reduce the amount of misinformation and inflammatory material
reaching the voters, and will further a rational vote. However, this
rational vote may not be a particularly compelling state interest when
measured against a First Amendment interest. 3 3 A disclosure statute
does, in one sense, result in a more informed vote: all the campaign

130. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (upholding, by a narrow majority,
ban on electioneering within 100 feet of a polling site in the interest of preventing voter intimidation and voter fraud). An abundance of federal election reform measures (and cases sustaining
them) testifies to our continuing concern about the effects of undue influence, bribery, and financial quid pro quo in the election arena. See, e.g., Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Act of Feb.
28, 1925, ch. 368, title 111, 43 Stat. 1070-74 (repealed 1972) (responding to Teapot Dome Scandal,
in which President Harding's Secretary of the Interior granted noncompetitive oil leases to a
substantial backer of the Republican Party); Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934)
(sustaining the same); 1974 Amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2,5,18,26, and 47 U.S.C.) (responding in part
to the laundering of contributions to the Committee to Re-elect the President uncovered during
the Watergate hearings); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (sustaining portions of the same).
131. The Ohio statute is overbroad for the purposes of preventing corruption and financial
quid pro quo. Specifically, it requires disclosure on publications regarding ballot issues, in addition to publications regarding candidates. The threat of corruption is greatly reduced in referenda pertaining to elections. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 29697 (1981) ("Buckley identified a single narrow exception to the rule that limits on political activity were contrary to the First Amendment. The exception relates to the perception of undue
influence of large contributors to a candidate... Buckley does not support limitations on contributions to committees formed to favor or oppose ballot measures."); First Nat'l Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1977) ("The risk of corruption perceived in cases involving candidate elections ... simply is not present in a popular vote on a public issue."). See also Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1965) (drawing distinction between statute regulating editorials on
election day and statute regulating "conduct in and around the polls in order to maintain peace,
order, and decorum").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
133. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) ("The State's fear that voters might make
an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for limiting
speech.").
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literature which reaches the public identifies its source. 134 There is,
however, a certain illogic to disclosure requirements in the name of
voter education: to the extent that disclosure laws deter speech, the
volume, or at least the diversity, of information reaching voters may
actually decrease. 35 Arguably, the exclusion from the pre-election
debate of a distinct body of political speech decreases the ability of
the voters to make a fully informed choice." 3 Moreover, knowledge
of a message's source may not be necessary information, since voters
are capable of discounting for anonymity. Finally, at some point voter
education is not even a legitimate interest. Some information will be
too irrelevant (for example, the medical history of the author) or too
for
protected (for example, the religious beliefs of the candidate)
"voter education" to be a successful disclosure argument. 137
The North Carolina Supreme Court did not justify the North Carolina disclosure statute on the grounds of "voter education." Nor could
it have; insofar as the statute requires disclosure only on publications
containing "derogatory" charges about candidates, it would be vastly
underinclusive for the purposes of voter education. Presumably voters need to know the source of praise as much as they need to know
the source of criticism. Moreover, even if. a fiat disclosure requirement was constitutional on the basis of voter education, the distinction
134. See Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480, 481 (1987) (sustaining portions of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1988), which requires disclosure on political propaganda of foreign origin and labelling of it as "political propaganda" because such disclosure "would better enable the public to evaluate the import of propaganda" and "the best

remedy for misleading or inaccurate speech contained within the materials subject to the Act is
fair, truthful, and accurate speech."); Vierick v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black,
J., dissenting) (statute labelling information "of foreign origin so that ... readers may not be
deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinterested source ... implements
rather than detracts from the prized freedoms of the First Amendment.").
135. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 798 (1982):

A State's claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by
restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism. As we
observed in another First Amendment context, it is often true 'that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them.'
(quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976)). See also Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding government interest in
informed electorate insufficient to sustain statute because it was more likely to impede than to

inform).
136. See State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 204, 432 S.E.2d 832, 852-53 (1993) (Mitchell, J.,
dissenting) ("Rather than being necessary to encourage openness, honesty, and fairness in the
electoral process, the criminal statute at issue here frustrates these goals by reducing the amount
of relevant truthful information about candidates for public office that will reach the voting
public.").
137. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1963) (striking on equal protection grounds Lou-

isiana statute which required that ballots designate the race of each candidate). The court wrote:
"[T]he attached provision [cannot] be deemed to be reasonably designed to meet legitimate
governmental interests in informing the electorate as to candidates. We see no relevance in the
state's pointing up the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualification for office." Id. at
403.
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between derogatory publications and their alternative (neutral or
praising publications) works an additional discrimination on the basis
of content (a basis apparently unrelated to voter education). Accordingly, some additional justification is required. 138 The scope of the
statute (derogatory charges, whether true or false) and the court's explanation of the statute's purpose (prohibiting pejorative material to
insure a fair election 139) suggest that the State has passed the functional equivalent of a seditious libel statute.' 40 By proscribing a
species of criticism (anonymous criticism) without regard to its truthfulness, North Carolina effectively silences the critics of incumbents or
forces their public exposure. There is, in this statute, the whiff of official suppression of ideas. It is for this reason that the Court's holding
in McIntyre will not be dispositive with respect to the North Carolina
statute.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Without question, the state has an interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. Reflecting this interest, Congress and
state legislatures have passed a substantial number of laws regulating
the election arena. Many of these laws have been sustained by the
United States Supreme Court. Particularly in the context of campaign
finance reform, the Court has upheld laws relatively invasive of First
Amendment prerogatives.
Statutes banning anonymous campaign literature serve several purposes in the election arena. First, few would dispute that last minute
anonymous smears create an undignified political arena. Disclosure
statutes provide a deterrent effect which arguably reduces the amount
of "mudslinging." Second, knowing the identity of the author of a
piece of writing can shed light on its credibility. There is, however, a
fundamental logical flaw in a scheme which only slightly increases the
information about some campaign literature, at the expense of an entire segment of political speech.
Despite their usefulness, disclosure statutes tread heavily on First
Amendment interests and raise serious concerns of overbreadth.
138. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992) ("these areas of
speech can ... be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribablecontent ... [but not]
made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable

content.").
139. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
140. Compare State v. Petersilie, 334 N.C. 169, 204, 432 S.E.2d 832, 853 (1993) (Mitchell, J.,

dissenting) ("disparaging and belittling material about a particular candidate may often be true;
its very truthfulness can make it more derogatory and hurtful than ies") (quoting State's brief)
with the maxim "the greater the truth, the greater the libel." See Richard Epstein, A Common

Lawyer Looks at ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 B.U. L. REv. 699, 724 n.84 (1992) (explaining
history of the maxim).
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Both the North Carolina and the Ohio statutes, for example, are overbroad to protect the state interest in preventing or deterring libel of
candidates. While the Ohio statute is perhaps perfectly tailored to inform the electorate, it raises the more complicated question of how we
are to weigh a rational and informed electorate against the loss of a
distinct body of political speech.
It is in this context that the metaphor of a marketplace of free
speech is most compelling. 14 1 The First Amendment protects a marketplace in which ideas freely clash and compete, the public evaluates,
and the truth eventually triumphs. While anonymity may weigh
against the credibility of a particular piece of campaign literature, the
First Amendment leaves this judgment to the voters. 42 With the government staying its hand, the voters may weigh anonymous speech for
themselves. The First Amendment stakes everything on the integrity
of this process. 43
ERIKA KING*

141. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas... the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").

142. See Good v. Roy, 459 F. Supp. 403, 406 (D. Kan. 1978) ("[I]t is the prerogative of the

voters... to weigh, balance, sift, and sort the words and actions of political candidates.").

143. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring):
But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect the public against
false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority
from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and
religion. In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false for us.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 1995. I am grateful to Professor William Van Alstyne for his comments and suggestions.

